




Illicit affairs : Philadelphia’s trade with Lisbon
before independence, 1700-1775
Negócios ilícitos : o comércio entre Filadélfia e Lisboa antes da independência, 
1700-1775 








ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Printed version
Date of publication: 31 December 2019




Jeremy Land and Rodrigo da Costa Dominguez, « Illicit affairs : Philadelphia’s trade with Lisbon before
independence, 1700-1775 », Ler História [Online], 75 | 2019, Online since 31 December 2019,
connection on 06 January 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/lerhistoria/5936  ; DOI :
10.4000/lerhistoria.5936 
Ler História está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons - Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0
Internacional.
Ler História | 75 | 2019 | pp. 179-204
179
ILLICIT AFFAIRS: PHILADELPHIA’S TRADE WITH LISBON
BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, 1700-1775
Jeremy Land
Georgia State University, USA
land25.jeremy@gmail.com
Rodrigo da Costa Dominguez 
Universidade do Minho, Portugal
rcdominguez80@gmail.com
Traditional narratives of colonial America and the Atlantic World tend 
to accept, without few deviations, that empires were mostly consolidated 
and trade between colonies and metropole traveled in two directions. Recent 
research in the field of Atlantic and imperial history has eroded the histori-
cal hegemony of empires, showing the diverse and complex nature of trade 
in and around the Atlantic Ocean. In this vein of analysis, we investigate 
the surprisingly robust trade between Philadelphia and Lisbon during the 
18th century while Philadelphia was still under British rule. 
Our main efforts will be to try to detail and quantify the commerce 
and shipping movement between the two cities on two sides of the Atlantic 
and in two different empires. Some of the questions we ask of the archives 
include what the nature of this trade was and how did it come to pass. 
Perhaps most importantly, how did the British and Portuguese officials 
view this trade and what were their responses? Lisbon’s and Philadelphia’s 
archives hold mentions of this trade in Customs House papers which sug-
gest that British officials were at least aware of the trade and even permitted 
This paper explores the economic relationship between Lisbon and Philadelphia prior 
to Philadelphia’s independence from the British Empire. Technically illegal according to 
the various imperial policies that Britain imposed on the American colonies, Philadelphia 
built and maintained a robust trade par tnership with the por t of Lisbon. Using data 
from archives in both Philadelphia and Lisbon, we argue that the relationship signifies 
Philadelphia’s orientation away from the British Isles and the importance of Philadelphia 
in the Atlantic economy. 
Keywords: trade, colonialism, Philadelphia, Lisbon, Portugal, United States.
Resumo (PT) no final do artigo. Résumé (FR) en fin d’article. 
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this trade to continue. In the end, we contend that Philadelphia practiced 
an economy that was trans-imperial in nature and oriented away from its 
imperial master, and its trade was much more diverse than what would 
be allowed under a truly mercantilist empire. In addition, we hope to 
highlight the early origins of economic connections between Portugal and 
British America, contrary to the historical relations of British supremacy 
to Portugal and to the thirteen colonies. In the end, we seek to clarify the 
role that both Lisbon and Philadelphia had in shaping not only Portuguese 
and American trade, but their role in shaping the entire Atlantic economy.
Overall, our main objectives are to emphasize the continued economic 
power of Lisbon in Atlantic trade and show how Philadelphia developed 
into a major, nodal center of trans-imperial Atlantic trade. First, we pro-
vide an overview of the historical context and economic situation in both 
Philadelphia and Lisbon. Furthermore, we highlight how the difficulties 
that Portugal faced disabled its imperial power and capability to hold off the 
British, Dutch, and French efforts to control transatlantic trade. Secondly, 
we want to emphasize the political and economic realities that made colo-
nial subjects in North America interested in trading directly with Southern 
Europe, mainly Lisbon. We are aware that Philadelphia-owned ships, in 
apparent contradiction with the British Navigations Acts, shipped goods to 
Lisbon on a regular basis. We also know that ships from different empires 
maintained regular routes shipping wheat (both raw and flour) and staves 
from Philadelphia to Lisbon where they brought aboard salt to take back to 
Philadelphia.1 What made this particular route so attractive to ship owners, 
merchants and captains? Finally, we hope to detail specific examples in the 
archival sources to help explain how individual merchants and ship owners/
captains engaged with this peculiar trade route. Were they concerned with 
the imperial border between Portugal and British America? Was smuggling a 
substantial portion of the overall trade between the two ports, or was most 
of the trade legal or at least tolerated by imperial officials? The micro data 
will allow us to better understand the historical context surrounding this 
fascinating example of inter-imperial trade. 
We utilize primary and secondary source material found on both sides 
of the Atlantic to build and compare datasets in order to find and quantify 
missing numbers of ships flowing between the two cities in two differ-
ent empires. For Philadelphia, we utilized Philadelphia Customs House 
1 Some ships transported all three at the same time, such as the ship “Hetty”, captained by Thomas Luch. 
Arquivo Municipal de Lisboa – Arquivo Histórico, Colecção Impostos, Fundo Marco dos Navios (hereafter, 
AML-AH MN), Livro de Entradas do Marco dos Navios, ref. AML-AH-MN, liv. 63, fl. 22v. (1770).
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records and the papers of individual merchants, many of which found in 
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, to uncover previously unused data 
sets that document the longstanding economic relationship between Lisbon 
and Philadelphia. We also utilize customs house entry and exits reported 
by the Pennsylvania Gazette to establish a baseline of figures officially 
accepted by the British imperial structure. We then compare these figures 
with the numbers of ships reported by Lisbon’s Marco dos Navios (Tonnage 
duties). We also lean on the work of previous historians on both sides of 
the Atlantic for general and occasionally specific trade data that helps to 
provide background for our new data analysis. 
In our conclusions, we highlight the importance of this relationship to 
later political and economic developments. Portugal becomes an essential 
partner in trade with the fledgling United States, becoming primary for 
both nations during major crises of war, especially during the Napoleonic 
invasion of Portugal and the British-American War of 1812 (Land, Eloranta 
and Moreira 2019, 43-45). Did these early relationships between Philadel-
phia and Lisbon allow for later growth in trade? This article intends to shed 
some light into those questions.
1. Background: Portugal, Britain, and British America 
Portugal in the 18th century can be defined by two distinct periods. 
The first fifty years is best described as the lull after the storm. It opens 
what Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro (2000, 132) calls a cycle “of internal and 
external political stability. A stability that not even the financial difficulties, 
only definitely controlled with Brazil’s apogee at the beginning of this same 
period, or the disturbances generated by the Church’s action would do”. 
All of this in the course of the long eighteenth century, “usually marked by 
jockeying for position and preparations for the next outbreak of hostilities” 
(Findlay and O’Rourke 2007, 247). On the other hand, the second can be 
portrayed as the time of “almost uninterrupted war in Europe, combined or 
coincident with occasional war outside” (Hobsbawm 1996, 77), as it would 
change the political status of the colonies in the New World and transform 
their economies. Nevertheless, this scenario was preceded by a period of 
political rupture, following the Portugal Independence’s Restoration wars 
(1640-1688). At that point, the Portuguese economy was in dire straits, 
associated with a downward trend of the Indian trade, and a series of military 
defeats in Africa and India, with the consequence of its possession’s losses 
(Newitt 2005, 246-248), which weakened its economy and resulted in a 
shift to an “Atlantic” focus in the empire’s exploration policy. 
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The Portuguese diplomacy played a very important role, sewing the 
marriage of Catherine of Braganza with Charles II (1660-1685). This 
matchmaking policy cemented the conditions to consolidate Portugal’s 
independence, underpinned by Britain’s military and naval support. On 
the other hand, this strategy paid its toll, offering to the British a series 
of commercial and territorial privileges (Hermann 2000, 175-176; Faria 
2008, 128-129). Militarily, the realm was dragged into the succession of 
the Spanish king. However, the war forced Portugal to ally with Great Bri-
tain, under the supervision of British ambassador John Methuen. On one 
hand, it represented a major financial setback to the Portuguese, creating an 
enormous external trade deficit (Schwartz 2010, 38). On the other hand, 
the Peace of Utrecht (1713) determined precisely new formal borders of 
colonial territories in South America, where the Portuguese developed mining 
activities, attracting more people to the colony (Alencastro 2010, 133-134). 
The transposition of that border enabled Portugal’s successful gold and 
diamond exploration as we can see in Table 1. Moreover, mining activity, 
combined with cattle breeding in Southern regions, helped “transforming the 
nature of the Portuguese Empire and Lisbon’s economic thought” regarding 
Brazil status as the backbone of Portugal finances (Schwartz 2010, 38-39). 
Table 1. Brazilian gold production (in metric tons), 1700-1799
Years Minas Gerais Goiás Mato Grosso Total 
1700-1710 2.7 – – 2.7
1711-1720 5.9 – – 5.9
1721-1729 6.6 – 0.7 7.3
1730-1739 8.2 1.4 0.9 10.5
1740-1749 9.0 3.2 1.0 13.2
1750-1759 7.6 4.3 1.0 12.9
1760-1769 6.4 2.3 0.5 9.2
1770-1779 5.3 1.8 0.5 7.6
1780-1789 3.8 0.9 0.4 5.1
1790-1799 3.0 0.7 0.4 4.1
Source: Pinto (1979, 114) and Schwartz (2010, 39). 
Recent works has shown that most of that gold ended up in private 
hands, with merchants and slave traders sending their profits, taking advantage 
of the fleets funded by the Portuguese crown, originally destined to state 
revenues’ remittances. Moreover, it enabled the establishment of comissários-
volantes (brokers) to intermediate the shipments (Costa and Rocha 2007, 
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94-95; Costa, Lains and Miranda 2011, 256-258; Sousa 2012, 337-340). 
Nevertheless, despite the debate and the evidences around the nature of 
gold remittances to Portugal, the actors involved and their receptors, as well 
as its utilization and how much Portugal profited effectively, it is evident 
the relevance of those revenues to the Portuguese state (Sampaio 2003, 
165-169; Costa and Rocha 2007, 79-84; Sousa 2012, 345). 
At least if not directly, through the taxation, gold exploitation triggered 
a major social and economic change through the operation of those mines, 
which requested a specific model of labor force utilization. Opposing the 
Spanish archetype, which used more Native Americans (either as slaves or 
salaried worker) than Africans brought into Spanish America (Bakewell 
2012, 118-126; Borucki, Eltis and Wheat 2015, 439-440), African slaves 
were the main gear that kept the whole Portuguese structure working, and 
indirectly, that institutional option boosted and consolidated the slave 
trade as one of the empire’s main economic pillars. Not by chance, Rio de 
Janeiro became capital in 1763 and the empire’s main maritime hub from 
the 1750s onwards, associated to both the fleets going to Portugal, carrying 
the gold from the mining districts and taxes collected, with commercial 
activity and the slave trade business boom (Sampaio 2003, 148-149; Fragoso 
2014, 358-367). The outcome of that expansion was a negotiation for new 
territorial boundaries, resulting in a new treaty signed in Madrid in 1750. 
Nevertheless, Pombal’s regime had major challenges to tackle. A substantial 
decrease in state revenues from the two main sources of income – customs 
duties and monopoly rights – demanded quick resolutions. Furthermore, 
a decline in gold extraction in Brazil, limiting both the gold shipping to 
Lisbon and the tax collection on gold exploration itself, began to deplete 
metallic deposits, compromising the empire’s financial capacities (Silva 
2005, 254-255).
Shortly after taking office, the new prime-minister Pombal had to deal 
with the greatest natural catastrophe of Portugal: The Earthquake of 1755. 
The enormity of such tragedy was measured, reaching level 10 (up to 12) 
of Mercalli’s ‘intensity’ scale and level 9 (maximum) of the Richter scale, 
which measures the magnitude of earthquakes (França 2008, 345-346), 
whose local impact was obviously felt in economic terms, in several dif-
ferent areas, requesting a governmental intervention especially in the real 
estate and credit markets (Costa, Rocha and Brito 2018, 79). Across the 
Atlantic, the Seven Years’ War dragged Portugal, once again, into another 
conflict: a series of Spanish attacks to the Portuguese possession of Sa- 
cramento. Portuguese settlers, reinforced by military forces, took Spanish 
fortresses near Montevideo in 1763. They resisted Spanish attacks for more 
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than a decade (Faria 2008, 148-149). In that sense, Portugal’s international 
position relied, strategically, on the “management of a vast empire which 
includes Brazil’s territory and the control of Atlantic shipping to the Afri-
can coast, as servile labor’s supplier” (Magalhães 2012, 173). Management 
which, in the short term, relied on the Portuguese neutrality (Cruz 2010, 
62-63; Cardoso 2010, 39-40), Britain’s support and a tentative policy of 
good relations with Spain. 
Britain’s 18th century, however, was a period of nearly endless war 
and expansion. Wars between Britain, France, Spain, and the Netherlands 
seemed to blur together throughout the 18th century, with a new major 
war virtually every decade. The Nine Years’ War in 1689-1697, the War of 
Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the War of Austrian Succession (1739-
1748), and the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) were all major wars before 
the American War for Independence that dragged multiple empires and 
regions into intense conflict. Still, skirmishes on the waters of the world’s 
oceans and at the fringes of empires continued uninterrupted throughout 
the entire century (Eloranta and Land 2011, 108-112).
While many of these wars seemed to be tied, on the surface, to political 
developments in Europe, all brought warfare to the empires of European 
combatants in efforts to expand the geographic reach of all those involved. 
For Britain, its wars before 1750 were largely efforts to stave off French and 
Dutch encroachment into its empire in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
Following these wars, many of the various territories captured or occupied 
during the conflicts would be exchanged back during treaty negotiations. 
However, the Seven Years’ War changed this practice, as Britain purposely 
sought to end France’s empire in North America and India. With the suc-
cess of the British in the Seven Years’ War in 1763, Britain took control of 
the vast majority of North America and pushed the French nearly entirely 
out of India (Eloranta and Land 2011, 102-105). 
British America factored greatly into Britain’s imperial expansion. Britain 
joined the list of European empires comparatively late. Starting slowly in 
the early 17th century with a few colonies in North America, it quickly 
became the preeminent imperial power in the Atlantic by the early 18th 
century, with colonial holdings in the Caribbean, the Americas, and Africa. 
For British Americans, however, this expansion meant limited attention 
from its imperial master. As a result, they were given unrivalled autonomy 
to establish local governments. In fact, many of these governments were 
tasked with supporting, both in terms of funding and manpower, the many 
wars that Britain fought between 1700-1750 (Anderson 2000). Britain’s 
expansion was not merely territorial, but economic as well. With the Asiento 
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of 1713, British merchants were given the exclusive rights to export, sell, 
and ship slaves from Africa to the empire of Spain. This development pro-
vided enormous opportunity for British economic expansion, as they also 
dominated the slave trade to Portuguese colonies. 
This meant economic growth for British America as well. Throughout 
the 18th century, a growing number of immigrants, indentured servants, 
and African slaves continued to provide additional labor for the growing 
territory of British America, especially in the southern colonies. More 
importantly, British Americans developed an expanding maritime sector, 
with shipbuilding and mercantile activity achieving predominance in major 
ports such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. As part of its mercantil-
ist empire, British American imports into Britain, “grew at roughly twice 
the rate of total imports, exports to them [Americans] nearly three times 
as fast as the total” (McCusker and Menard 1985). This reality forced the 
British imperial structure to recognize the growing economic power of 
British America, helping to convince British leaders to attempt to limit 
that growing power with new restrictions on trade and additional taxes in 
the late 1760s and early 1770s. 
2. Philadelphia and the Atlantic economy
When establishing the colony of Pennsylvania, William Penn realized 
that maritime commerce would be central to the success of the venture. 
Though Penn envisioned a more subsistence-based society, he recognized 
that maritime commerce would allow for Pennsylvanians to live above a 
mere subsistence level by selling surplus crops and timber products in the 
larger Atlantic marketplace. His choice of location for the port of Phila-
delphia allowed it to not only become a place where surplus agricultural 
products could find a home; Philadelphia also developed into a bustling, 
cosmopolitan center of economic activity well beyond subsistence, located 
on the banks of a river relatively deep into the hinterland granted agricul-
tural areas access to a worldwide market otherwise unattainable. In fact, 
being located on the major waterway into the interior of Pennsylvania made 
agricultural expansion into the frontier economically feasible and desirable 
(Jensen 1963, 2-3).
As Table 2 shows quite clearly, Philadelphia began its maritime trade 
with little focus on sending goods to the British Isles. Tobacco (one of the 
first products shipped out of Philadelphia) appears to have been shipped 
to anywhere but England. In much the same way, the vast majority of 
goods leaving and coming into the Port of Philadelphia were going to and 
186
J. Land, R. C. Dominguez | Illicit Affairs
coming from other colonies and other empires. In the period 1730-1734, 
959 ships cleared the port in those five years. Of those 959 clearances, 
only 138 or 15% went to either England or Ireland. Thus, 85% of those 
ships went elsewhere. 43% (416) went to the West Indies, and 33% (312) 
sailed throughout the coast of North America (see Appendix 1). This trend 
continued throughout the 18th century with Great Britain and Ireland only 
making up 12.6% of total exports from Philadelphia by 1772 (McCusker 
and Menard 1985, 196).
Table 2. Distribution of Philadelphia tobacco exports, 1704-1709







Curaçao and Bonire 12 6%
Nevis 4 2%
Newfoundland 6 3%
New York 12 6%
Rhode Island 2 1%
Total 205 100%
West Indies 160 78%
North America 45 22%
Total 205 100%
Source: Duties Account Book, 1704-13, in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
Philadelphia’s export trade throughout the 18th century, excepting the 
first decade, was dominated by grain and flour. Wheat is the most common 
commodity exported, but its form changed over time. Initially, raw grain 
was dominant, but as the colony developed, flour and bread (of various 
types) became primary. This transition indicates a couple of developments. 
First, exporting flour rather than grain suggests a growing milling industry 
that required capital investment beyond just subsistence milling. Second, 
it hints at a growing separation between farmer and merchant. Rather 
than take the grain directly to the merchant, the farmer may only need 
to sell or contract his grain with a mill owner/operator who would then 
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sell milled flour to merchants in the grade (coarse, fine, etc.) and quantity 
they requested (Hunter 2001, 2-3). According to Brooke Hunter (2001, 
13-15), this development provided a means for colonists to expand agri-
cultural production deeper into the hinterland, aided by the vast waterways 
of Pennsylvania. 
The growth in Philadelphia’s grain trade was substantial. Philadelphia 
exported 38,570 barrels of flour in 1730 (Lydon 1967, 402), but by 1774 
a total of 265,967 barrels were shipped out of the port – a 590% increase 
(Jensen 1963, 292). Much of this growth was due in large part to a series 
of wars in the Atlantic World, especially Europe. During the Seven Years’ 
War, the influx of soldiers into North America provided a boost to the 
farmers and millers of Pennsylvania (Hunter 2005, 508). Wheat and flour 
were rarely sent in large amounts to Britain proper. Rather, the West 
Indies continued to serve as a major market for Philadelphia’s grain and 
flour production. In Table 3, the destinations of bread and flour from 
Philadelphia are broken down into regions. West Indian destinations com-
posed about one-third of total exports. Surprisingly, Southern Europe is 
also roughly a third of Philadelphia’s bread and flour trade. Philadelphia 
merchants clearly were oriented away from the mother country, focusing 
instead on colonial and inter-imperial markets. As we discuss in greater 
detail below, we have also seen an enormous number of ships going in 
ballast from Lisbon to undisclosed locations in the West Indies, where 
they then turned north to Philadelphia as their final port of call before 
returning to Lisbon. This suggests that both Lisbon and Philadelphia 
merchants may have been operating trade in slaves, illicit goods and 
wares, or moving legal goods (wheat, flour, staves, etc.) from ship to ship 
to avoid British customs. 
Table 3: Exports of bread and flour from Philadelphia, 1768-1772















1768 6,970 4,353 5,367 1,688 18,378 330,726
1769 10,630 15,212 6,866 1,443 34,151 514,728
1770 11,212 13,206 7,376 902 32,696 515,616
1771 12,253 8,838 7,923 550 29,564 517,370
1772 11,556 10,977 7,054 1,572 30,159 615,244
Source: Jensen (1963, 292).
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As a colony, North America’s production and trade were meant to enrich 
Britain and British merchants. Between 1660 and 1673, several laws and 
acts were passed by the British Parliament to create a mercantilist empire 
wherein the colonies were only to trade with or through Britain. The Navi-
gation Act of 1660 stipulated that “no goods or commodities whatsoever 
shall be imported into or exported out of any lands, islands, plantations, 
or territories [that belong to the King of Britain]… but in such ships or 
vessels as do truly and without fraud belong only to the people of England 
or Ireland”.2 In short, trade can only be conducted outside of the British 
Empire as long as the ships or cargoes be majority owned or operated by 
British merchants and mariners. The Staple Act of 1663 and the Plantation 
Duties Acts of 1673 levied taxes, duties, and penalties on commodities enter-
ing or leaving British colonies.3 Responsibility to enforce these laws were 
given to the governors of the colonies, under the supervision of the Privy 
Council’s Committee on Plantation Affairs (or “Lords of Trade”), which 
was also tasked with overseeing trade throughout the entire British Empire 
(Barrow 1967, 7). Because colonial merchants frequently violated the laws, 
Britain issued new acts re-enforcing the original ones and increasing the 
penalties. The Navigation Act of 1696, the Woolen Act of 1699, and the 
Naval Stores Act in 1705 increased the number of commodities that were 
to be taxed, which further restricted the scale and scope of trade carried 
out by colonial merchants.4
In order to enforce these laws, the British Parliament created a supervisory 
agency that formally brought the previously decentralized customs houses 
and officers into alignment. The Commission of the Board of Trade, passed 
on May 15, 1696, formally created a “Board of Trade” tasked with central-
izing and improving the enforcement of trade restrictions and collection 
of duties in British colonies, which replaced the old “Lords of Trade” with 
commissioners of trade.5 At the same time, the Commissioners of the Cus-
toms, based in London, was revamped to approve basic salaries for customs 
officers and collectors to be paid out of the government’s accounts. Under 
the reforms of 1696, 29 positions for customs collectors were formalized, 
but many of these positions remained unfilled until 1764. It seems that the 
customs department never received the full resources it required to enforce 
2 “The Navigation Act of (Sept. 13) 1660” as printed in Greene (1975, 134-136). 
3 “The Staple Act of (July 27) 1663” and “The Plantation Duties Act of (Mar. 29) 1673” as printed in Greene 
(1975, 136-139).
4 “The Navigation Act of (Apr. 10) 1696”, “The Woolen Act (May 4, 1699)”, and “The Naval Stores Act 
(Mar. 14, 1705” as printed in Greene (1975, 210-217).
5 “The Commission of the Board of Trade (May 15, 1696)” as printed in Greene (1975, 218-221).
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the acts, which then enabled the colonial governments and merchants to 
circumvent and even disregard the laws (Barrow 1967, 64-66). 
We have yet to find any example where imperial officials legally made 
exceptions for direct trade to Portugal’s mainland, making the Navigation 
Acts of the late 17th century the primary laws regarding trade in the colonies 
and direct trade with Lisbon technically illegal. The only exceptions made for 
trade to Portuguese destinations were for salt and wine from islands south 
of Cape Finisterre, such as Madeira, in the 1663 Staple Act, yet illegal trade 
still composed a large portion of that commerce likely to avoid customs 
duties (Ribeiro 1997, I, 37; Fisher 2006, 19). However, it was well known 
to British officials, colonial governors, and merchants in Philadelphia that 
customs officers generally allowed for trade between Southern Europe, espe-
cially Portuguese locations, and British America. Before 1764, the general 
rule was that cargoes of wheat and flour could be exported to Lisbon and 
imports of salt, wine, and lemons were allowed as long as they met even 
the slightest of requirements such as an English merchant having even the 
smallest share of the cargo or ship. In cases where even the pretense of 
legality could not be established, customs agents accepted lemons and wine 
as “presents” to grease the wheels of commerce. These conditions reigned 
until 1763 when the end of the Seven Years’ War brought reforms and a 
new imperial effort to enforce the Navigation Acts. In 1764, the governor 
of Massachusetts defended a collector who had accepted one such bribe 
because until the reforms of the 1760s, those gifts had been a normal part 
of business. Therefore, it was unfair to charge him of dereliction of duty 
since the collector had just recently received new instructions prohibiting 
such practices (Barrow 1967, 145). 
Smuggling and the problems associated with it were of primary concern 
to British officials and customs houses. In the Port of Philadelphia Customs 
House records, the first volume or so is largely composed of documents 
relating to court cases regarding possible smugglers. For instance, a customs 
official in Barbados had impounded a ship that was carrying Spanish soap 
that was still packaged in chests that were much like the chests that Span-
ish merchants used. In effect, the official charged the captain with merely 
moving the chests from a Spanish ship to a Philadelphia ship to hopefully 
smuggle into Barbados.6
Of additional concern was the continuous importation and export of 
goods from British colonies and rival empires. The very first document 
6 HSP, Port of Philadelphia Customs House Papers, 1704-1789, Vol. 1. 
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in the Customs House records detail the job requirements of the customs 
officers for Philadelphia. The British official suggested to his deputy: “I, 
therefore, most earnestly recommend it to you, to be particularly careful, 
that no foreign vessel touching in your district, land any tea, linen, or any 
other European or Asiatic commodity”.7 For most of the 18th century, 
British efforts to quell smuggling and inter-imperial trade were limited 
in both form and success. Part of the problem was that legislators had 
assumed that most of the colonial trade would be handled by ships owned 
by British merchants and companies. Unfortunately, that was just not the 
case (Barrow 1967, 6). Colonial owned shipping managed to carve out a 
substantial profit from not only carrying colonial products but products 
from around the Atlantic and beyond. In this sense, the charges for freight 
carried on board colonial-owned shipping was greater than the value of 
any one commodity exported from the colonies (McCusker 1997, 246).
Following the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War with France in 1763, 
Britain redoubled its efforts to limit colonial smuggling. Though in their 
success, dramatically increased tensions between the colonists and the metro-
pole (Barrow 1967).8 In the British efforts to consolidate its newly expanded 
empires, Philadelphia played a central role in organizing the British Customs 
Offices into a more effective force. As early as 1759, officials in Philadelphia 
served as overseers for customs houses in Quebec City and Montreal as they 
were captured and occupied by British troops. Furthermore, regular updates 
and accounts from West Indies ports were sent to Philadelphia to be included 
in Philadelphia archives throughout the last half of the 18th century.9
Regardless of British efforts, Philadelphia’s trade with Southern Europe 
only increased during the 18th century. From 1750-1772, the percentage 
of Philadelphia’s total annual exports shipped to Southern Europe grew 
from 7% to 19% (McCusker and Menard 1985, 196). By 1770, Southern 
Europe’s share of Philadelphia’s overseas raw wheat exports approached 100%. 
Table 4 shows how important Southern Europe was to Philadelphia’s grain 
trade. Combined with the information from Table 3 above, Philadelphia’s 
merchants may not have considered the British idea of mercantilism all 
that appealing. From their standpoint, it is understandable that increased 
7 HSP, Port of Philadelphia Customs House Papers, 1704-1789, Vol. 1.
8 There is much on the topic of the Navigation Acts and subsequent efforts to raise funds leading to the 
American Revolution. Barrow (1967) is an older, but still relevant perspective on the British efforts to 
enforce its economic policies. Another valuable title is Lawrence Harper (1939). While the laws, no doubt, 
had significant impact in England, they had little impact in British America prior to 1763, thanks in no 
small part due to geographic realities. 
9 HSP, Port of Philadelphia Customs House Papers, 1704-1789.
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restrictions on foreign trade would have been enormously detrimental to 
the economy of Philadelphia. 
Table 4. Exports and value of wheat from Philadelphia, 1768-1772 
Year
Southern Europe British Isles Total
bushels £ stlg bushels £ stlg bushels £ stlg
1768 155,233 48,976 19,487 6,148 174,720 55,124
1769 165,315 45,296 22,740 6,231 188,055 51,527
1770 128,541 38,048 845 250 129,386 38,298
1771 34,581 11,723 11,607 3,935 46,188 15,658
1772 82,888 32,078 1,716 664 84,604 32,742
Source: Shipping data from Jensen (1963, 293); Prices from Bezanson et al. (1935).
The relationship between Philadelphia and Lisbon is of a peculiar nature. 
There are large numbers of observations that imply that a longstanding trade 
existed between Lisbon and Philadelphia that not only occurred through-
out the 18th century, but official port records of the Port of Philadelphia 
contain myriad examples of trade coming and going between Lisbon and 
Philadelphia.10 This suggests that British officials were aware of the trade 
and apparently gave their blessing to the growing trade between the two. 
In the port registry of Lisbon, one entry is quite confusing considering 
the nature of 18th century imperial relationships. In that entry, a French 
owned and crewed ship apparently made regular trips between Philadelphia, 
Lisbon, and sometimes a French colony in the Caribbean. In Philadelphia 
it picked up a shipload of grain or flour, proceeded to unload that cargo 
in Lisbon, and then continued in ballast (empty) to the Caribbean. It is 
as yet unclear what, if anything, the ship picked up in the Caribbean, but 
the entry is intriguing nonetheless.11 All this suggest that Philadelphia may 
not have only served as a nodal center of the British Empire, but possibly 
as a nodal center of the larger Atlantic economy.
Philadelphia trade to Lisbon is also odd considering that individual 
merchants and customs officials were apparently unconcerned with list-
ing Lisbon as a port of destination. For example, Christopher Marshall, a 
Philadelphia merchant, processed three separate shipments in quick suc-
10 HSP, Port of Philadelphia Customs House Papers, 1704-1789, Vol. 1. This is just one of several collec-
tions held by the HSP that contain clear evidence of Lisbon being a primary port of call for Philadelphia 
shipping. Most of the collections listed in the Bibliography contain mentions of this trade. 
11 French ship “Maria Iara”, captained by Bertrand Guequem, whose entrance in Lisbon was registered in 
January 16th, 1769. AML-AH-MN, liv. 62, fl. 2 (1769).
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cession between June and July 1765. All total, the shipments contained 
2.905 bushels of corn, 2.281 bushels and 101 bags of wheat, 321 barrels 
of flour, 128 barrels of bread, 21 barrels of middlings (medium or coarse 
grade flour), and one barrel of gammon. Each shipment was meant for a 
different merchant or merchant house in Lisbon.12 This variety of goods, 
though all of which were foodstuffs, indicates a deep and complex rela-
tionship between merchants on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, it 
indicates responsiveness to specific requests, suggesting a communication 
network that transcended imperial and lingual borders.
Clearly, wheat shipments were a major sector of Philadelphia’s economy. 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the American Revolution, Philadelphia’s 
trade in raw wheat alone was extremely valuable, and a major source of capital 
that allowed Philadelphia merchants and ship owners to reinvest in additional 
ships and crews. As seen in Table 2 above, trade to Southern Europe (nearly 
all of which went to or through Lisbon) accounted for 89% (£48,976) of total 
wheat exports in the year 1768 (£55,124). Lisbon was key to Philadelphia’s 
economic success, and during the year 1770, a total of 24,560 ship tons trav-
eled through Philadelphia on the way to or from Southern Europe compared 
to 7,913 that went to England. Southern Europe made up 26% of that year’s 
total tonnage entering and clearing the port of Philadelphia, whereas Eng-
land supplied 8% (see Appendix 2). Given the discrepancy in the amount of 
tonnage moving between the two destinations, it is clear that Philadelphia’s 
trade was oriented away from England (her imperial master) and extremely 
invested in trade with Southern Europe and, more specifically, Portugal.
3. Lisbon and British America
As the “newly minted United States” (Atack 2014, 550) emerged, a 
new window of opportunity opened to the Portuguese empire. Nevertheless, 
the starting point of those relations began long before 1776. The establish-
ment of Portugal as one of the driving forces of the early modern Oceanic 
expansion relied on the commercial connections with Northern Europe 
and the Mediterranean, based on the trade of one of the country’s main 
commodities since the Later Middle Ages: salt, as a vital article to both 
cod fishery and pork breeding industries (see Rau 1951 and 1984; Abreu 
2005). Of course, it would be essential to cooking, for seasoning dishes, 
but also fundamental to leather production. The absence of salt among the 
12 HSP, Bills of Lading, 27 June and 4 July, 1765, Marshall Bills of Lading.
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Navigation Acts’ restrictions, as well as the recognition of the Portuguese 
salt’s excellence by the Americans, superior to the British equivalent, would 
help to boost its use enough to be relevant to their exports’ activities in the 
1600s and 1700s, bring up the attention of French and British to the salt 
business in Cape Verde (Ribeiro 1997, I, 35-38, 48).  
As the salt, wine was one of the fundamental items of the Portuguese set 
of exports. However, the whole process, from the production until the ship-
ping and retailing, received a major British investment, resulting in an effective 
supremacy of the British since the 1650s, even more evident in the Douro region 
and Oporto’s international maritime connections (Silva 2008, 146). This fact 
is inserted within the context of the Anglo-French commercial, political and 
military competitiveness, as well as to the Portuguese independence restoration 
and the openness of Brazilian markets to British textiles (Fisher 2006, 24-29; 
Soares 2008, 215). In fact, when Methuen first negotiated the treaty’s terms 
within the context of the War of the Spanish succession, Portugal made a risky 
bet. As already observed by other scholars, the Portuguese “…specialized in 
a commodity that did not have the same growth potential as did cloth for 
England. Portugal’s economy suffered consequently, as the productive structure 
and institutions were molded in the direction of wine production” (Cypher 
and Dietz 2004, 117). A choice that “undermined a newly born program of 
manufactures’ creation initiated in the end of 17th century” (Schwartz 2010, 
38), despite the opposition of D. Luís da Cunha, directly involved in the 
diplomatic negotiations of the treaty, who anticipated the negative impacts of 
that agreement to the Portuguese economy (Silva 2014, 21-24).
On the other hand, Portugal’s wine business had other strongholds in 
the islands of Madeira and Azores. The massive presence of wine from both 
places in British North America since the 1690s, as well as Spanish wine 
from the Canary Islands, is already known, entering especially at the ports 
of Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Charleston (Ribeiro 1997, I, 41). So 
popular was wine from Madeira in British America, it transformed from a 
luxury item into a regular dinner table staple in colonial America (Hancock 
2009, xxix). Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the restrictions of 
1663, and its reinforcements through the 1696 Act, not only Portuguese 
wine entered the colonies, but also plenty of North American grainstuffs 
were shipped to Lisbon and other Portuguese ports, such as wheat, barley, 
oats, rye, malt and flour (Bebiano 1960, 40-41, 77; Fisher 2006, 17-18), 
as well as rice from the Carolinas. Technically, that trade was forbidden 
by the regulations of 1660 and 1663, but that trade kept going on illicitly 
between the colonies and Portugal, illustrating partially the British incapa-
bility of shutting it down and the reinforcement of colonies’ local powers 
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(Cruz 2014, 7), which resulted in a later authorization for rice exports to 
Southern Europe (Ribeiro 1997, I, 51-52, 57-58).
In this sense, the lack of a more effective colonial control is something 
associated to an attempt of a reform movement between 1727 and 1733, when 
British Parliament decided not to fortify the Crown’s power by endorsing 
a colonial policy reinforcement (Henretta 2015, 104-106). Moreover, the 
debate around the illicitness of that trade is something that permeates not 
only the dynamics around the commodities’ flow between the colonies and 
European metropolises and their respective empires’ border areas, but also the 
transport of labor force from Africa to the Americas and Britain’s share on 
that business (Hernández González 1991, 98-103; Ribeiro 1997, I, 42-43; 
Eltis and Richardson 1995, 467). The issue of contraband, or a “legalized 
contraband” in slave trade, also interconnects the success of English sugar 
business in the Caribbean and the low price of slaves (Borucki, Eltis and 
Wheat 2015, 438-439; Fisher 2006, 30-33) with the dispute for dominance 
in the slave trade in West Africa between the Dutch WIC, Britain, France 
and the Luso-Brazilians (Lopes 2008, 176-182; Soares 2008, 220).     
In another part of the negotiations which resulted in the Peace of 
Utrecht, Great Britain received from Spain, as well as the French, the asiento 
(concession) to trade African slaves in Spanish America for a period of 30 
years, with permission to include a merchant ship with British goods every 
time the Spanish fleet was sent to America. This had a substantial impact 
because it “decisively changed one of the main principles of colonial trade’s 
protectionism: the foreigners’ exclusion” (Souto Mantecón 2015, 194-195). 
With Portugal, the same principle would be adopted to try to ensure British 
participation in the slave trade, built and controlled by the Portuguese, at 
the Western African coast in Cabinda (Monteiro 1996, 126). That situation 
established the Pax Lusitana, i.e., the network assembled in South Atlantic, 
which ensured the British entrance in the South Atlantic circuit before the 
Opening Ports to friendly Nations’ decree of 1808 (Penha 2011, 34-35). 
With these agreements, Britain created a multilateral network, using Portu-
guese outposts to try to quell slave trade and, at the same time, insert their 
captains and businessman into that trade, holding a privileged position in 
the Atlantic shipping by operating the main sea routes and ports, both in 
North (Lisbon) and South (River Plate, Brazil and Africa).
Other commercial circuits and connections between the Northern and 
Central Spanish American colonies (Campeche, Guatemala and Honduras), 
and even Spanish ports (Cartagena) were British targets as well, since the 
hostilities started with the War of Spanish Succession kept going throughout the 
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century.13 Nevertheless, regional navigation and trade was done by locals and 
Spanish authorities avoided (when possible) piracy and smuggling, including 
the permission to take by sea products normally transported by land (Pinzón 
Ríos 2015, 317). Within this particular situation, British ships possibly used 
the Portuguese flag in order to breakthrough those circuits, largely dominated 
by the French and Spanish especially in the Caribbean, just as they penetrated 
South Atlantic trade during the Napoleonic Wars to dodge the Continental 
Blockade imposed by France (Moreira and Eloranta 2011, 416). 
Although the Portuguese sources used for this essay are primarily fiscal in 
nature, limiting in part our trade and shipping approach, it is possible to see 
in the Lisbon’s harbor tonnage tax entrance records a few ships between 1771 
and 1775 practicing flag shifting.14 In those cases, they are going through the 
route Falmouth/Philadelphia-Lisbon-Rio de Janeiro, carrying wheat, flour and 
staves to Portugal and, then, being loaded with “the cargo that would be avail-
able” at the port, continue its travel to Rio de Janeiro.15 In Table 5, the volume 
of British vessels passing through Portugal is quite significant in this period, 
especially considering the ones circulating between Lisbon and Philadelphia. 
For such a small city in comparison with London, Philadelphia’s share of 
British-Portuguese trade was substantial even during this period. At no point 
between 1769 and 1775 did the share of British shipping into Lisbon drop 
below 14%, and the vast majority of those ships carrying goods to and from 
Philadelphia were owned and operated by merchants based in Pennsylvania. 
Table 5. Number of British ships in Lisbon’s Port, 1769-1775











1769 1076 419 38.94 92 21.95 82 19.57
1770 1030 468 45.43 120 25.64 117 25.00
1771 1010 361 35.74 45 12.46 39 10.80
1772 1119 407 36.37 55 13.51 51 12.53
1773 966 324 33.54 43 13.27 49 15.12
1774 1076 406 37.73 48 11.82 38 9.35
1775 1073 381 35.5 62 16.27 46 12.07
Source: Lisbon Municipal Archive, Historical Archive, Collection “taxes”, Tonnage tax fund, Tonnage tax 
book of entries, refs. AML-AH-MN 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68.
13 Letters of July 4th and July 11th, 1752. ANTT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, cx. 688.
14 Ships “Anna” (1771) and “Maricas” (1775), captained by Thomas Dean and George Johnston, respec-
tively. AML-AH-MN, liv. 64, fl. 12v (1771) and AML-AH-MN, liv. 68, fl. 84 (1775). 
15 “Com a carga que se lhe oferecer”, as the source’s original text in Portuguese. AML-AH-MN, liv. 68, fl. 
84 (1775).
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On the other hand, if we consider Table 6, the Portuguese numbers 
show a notorious contrast when compared with the data revealed by 
Fisher (2006, 150, Appendix XI), which displays a lower number of ves-
sels clearing British Ports for both Portugal and Madeira. In this sense, it 
is evident that British data accounts for a major part, but not the entire 
shipping movement into Portugal. Besides, it is also important to highlight 
that the Portuguese data refers only to the entries in Lisbon’s port, not 
considering other relevant coastal harbors as Oporto, Setúbal or Aveiro, 
relevant commercial hubs during the 1700s. In fact, this number could be 
even more significant. Philadelphia, therefore, was a substantial partner 
in trade with Lisbon, and when one considers the expanding and diverse 
trade networks going through Philadelphia, it is clear that Philadelphia 
was one of many nodal centers that created such a vibrant oceanic mar-
ketplace. Moreover, Fisher’s data contemplates fundamentally the ports 
from the British Isles, disregarding Ireland and trade with Madeira Islands 
(Fisher 2006, 13). On the other hand, Lisbon’s records accounts for all 
ships coming under British flag (including Ireland), bringing to light a 
relevant issue of methodology on both sides. However, the number of 
entries and clearances from and to Irish ports is balanced with all British 
Isles’ ports, not interfering in the analysis as a whole.






TonnageNumber Tons Average Tonnage Number Tons
Average 
Tonnage
1771 141 15.561 110 16 1.954 122 157 112
1772 156 18.029 116 11 1.898 173 167 119
1773 124 14.735 119 11 1.325 120 135 119
1774 158 19.357 123 12 1.930 161 170 125
1775 168 18.620 111 10 956 96 178 110
Source: Public Records Office, Board of Trade 6/185 (extracted from Fisher 2006, 150, appendix XI).
Within these numbers, one of the aspects that we see as the most 
intriguing is the number of ships returning to Philadelphia from Lisbon in 
ballast. Between 1769 and 1775, over 130 vessels traveled the transatlantic 
voyage empty. More surprisingly, however, is the fact that many of those 
actually passed through either the Portuguese Islands, i.e., Azores, Madeira 
and Cape Verde, or through the Caribbean islands. Not by chance, many 
of the British ships’ endpoints after leaving Lisbon towards to America 
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are to the same as important slave trade hubs, such as Barbados,16 St. Kitts 
and Nevis,17 Jamaica,18 and Saint Domingue.19 This evidence reinforces our 
suggestion about the British presence within the Caribbean markets, by 
means of the established Portuguese networks and hubs to infiltrate those 
circuits using merchant ships in a kind of “multi-task” or “ad-hoc shipping”.
A wide range of goods were shipped from Philadelphia to Lisbon, such 
as raw grain (rice, corn, wheat, peas, fava beans), corn and plain flour, 
biscuit, ham, bacon, meat, staves, wax and textiles. Among those products, 
more than 76% of those exports were flour, wheat and staves. But on the 
way back to Philadelphia, imports from Lisbon were focused on one item: 
salt. Yet an astonishing 25% is related to ships returning to Pennsylvania 
in ballast, when another 30% were vessels carrying whatever cargo that was 
available in ports the ship visited either in Lisbon or in other ports of call. 
In Philadelphia, however, customs house entries and clearances show a 
different story. As seen in Table 7, British customs officers recorded about 
half of what Lisbon officials recorded as coming and leaving Lisbon. Some of 
the disparity, no doubt, is due to multiple stopovers, but still, the different 
figures indicate a substantial amount of illicit commerce (from the British 
perspective) flowing between the two cities. Whether commerce between 
Southern Europe and British America was largely allowed, much of that trade 
still found its way into American hands without going through the proper 
channels (i.e. customs). As we can see below, both cities relied on each other 
far more than they relied on trade with London, providing further evidence 
that the colony-metropole relationship that mattered to Philadelphia’s mer-
chants was its relationship between Philadelphia and Lisbon and not London. 
Lisbon commerce was essential to many of Philadelphia’s merchants. 
One such merchant was Tench Francis. In the space of three years, between 
1759 and 1761, Francis imported more than 17 million réis worth of cargoes 
from Portuguese locations, evenly composed of wine, lemons, and salt – salt 
being the largest quantities of the three commodities. Of that 17 million, 
just over 9 million réis came from Lisbon directly, the rest coming from 
Madeira and other small Portuguese islands. Though his export records are 
incomplete, he still managed to earn just under 9.8 million réis in profits 
in Lisbon from the sales of sugar, wheat, and a small number of European 
16 Ship “White Oak”, captained by John Savage. AML-AH-MN, liv. 63, fl. 24v. (1770).
17 Ship “Otter”, captained by George Catton. AML-AH-MN, liv. 65, fl. 2 (1772).
18 Ship “Harmony”, captained by William Barber. AML-AH-MN, liv. 68, fl. 2v. (1775).
19 Ships “Beautiful Daisy”, in 1772, and “Globe”, in 1775, captained by Samuel Darison and Thomas Pitt, 
respectively. AML-AH-MN, liv. 65, fl. 14 (1772) and AML-AH-MN, liv. 68, fl. 31v. (1775).
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manufacturers he reexported to Lisbon.20 Francis was just one merchant 
among many who had dealings with Lisbon merchants, and the fact that all 
but one small shipment was paid and received in réis indicates that he was 
dealing directly with Portuguese merchants and not English middlemen. 
The figures in Table 7 above are from the years 1769-1775. These years 
coincide with the most tenuous period for colonial American merchants 
as Britain began to more fully enforce its longstanding Navigation Acts of 
1673. Following the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, Britain pursued 
a more aggressive stance against illicit trade. Unfortunately for Philadelphia, 
its success also made it a central location from which British officials could 
expand its customs collection apparatus. As stated above, Philadelphia became 
the new home to a more centralized bureaucracy collecting customs house 
records from newly acquired ports in Canada beginning in 1760.21 In 1760, 
only five comptrollers were installed in the British colonies, likely the reason 
for such relaxed enforcement until 1763. However, between 1764 and 1766 
twenty-five more such officers were added to the colonial customs systems. 
Parliament also passed new acts, such as one in 1765 to establish the exact 
fees that customs officials were to be paid for doing their duty. Prior to 
1765, customs officials’ fees were set by the colonial legislatures, but that 
arrangement left the door wide open for abuses (Barrow 1967, 186-189). 
It is entirely plausible that Philadelphia’s trade with Lisbon was severely 
20 Tench Francis Invoice Book, 1759-1761, HSP.  
21 HSP, Port of Philadelphia Customs House Papers, 1704-1789.
Table 7. Philadelphia entries and clearances compared with Lisbon figures
(yearly averages, 1769-1774)
Destination/Origin
Philadelphia Customs Lisbon Tonnage Duties
Entries Clearances Entries Clearances
Lisbon 54 68 - -
London 15 8 1 2
Philadelphia - - 118 101
Source:  Pennsylvania Gazette, 1769-1774 and Lisbon Municipal Archive, Historical Archive, Collection 
“taxes”, Tonnage tax fund, Tonnage tax book of entries, refs. AML-AH-MN 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 
and 68. Note: We only compared 1769-1774 as in 1775 the Customs House stopped reporting entries 
and clearances to the Gazette by May 1775, likely due to the growing rebellion in British America. 
Tonnage is not reported in the newspapers, but almost all of the entries and clearances have been 
matched with the Lisbon records. These numbers, unlike Table 5, include ships that carried all flags, 
not just English. 
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hampered by the growing enforcement of customs rules and regulations and 
by the magnifying glass placed on Philadelphia by the new role it played 
in controlling trade in other ports as well.
4. Conclusion
From the data we have, it is apparent that the Lisbon-Philadelphia 
trade relationship is a special one. On both sides of the Atlantic, the trade 
from the other side was essential to the local economy. In Philadelphia, salt, 
Madeira, and port wine became profitable commodities and, in the case 
of salt, used to produce goods that were then shipped back to Lisbon and 
other markets. Lisbon was in constant need of Philadelphian wheat, flour, 
and lumber products to relieve shortages of the same. Perhaps even more 
important to this story are the trade routes that took ships from Lisbon to 
Brazil to the Caribbean and then on to Philadelphia. The commonality of 
this route suggests that imperial borders were merely obstacles to overcome 
rather than walls between maritime networks. More to the point, the many 
stops in these ships’ travels serve as evidence for trans-imperial trading being 
primary in the Atlantic, and Lisbon and Philadelphia were key choke points 
by which an entire ocean was connected. Once we apply the methodology of 
comparing data from multiple accounts, it is clear that a substantial portion 
of trade between the two cities did not get counted by the British imperial 
structure, providing further evidence of a weak mercantilist imperial structure.
Though Lisbon greatly profited from Philadelphia trade, Philadelphia 
is likely the partner that gained the most from its connection to Lisbon. 
Nevertheless, the connection between Southern Europe and British America 
was not limited to Philadelphia. In fact, Boston maintained a vibrant trade in 
fish, specifically cod, to Portugal, Spain, and other Catholic majority empires. 
When the Revolution arrived, Boston fishing merchants turned those Southern 
European fish markets into gunpowder access points. Merchants in Boston 
and Philadelphia took advantage of their colonial connections with Portugal 
and Spain to buy gunpowder and military supplies (Magra 2009, 27, 165). 
For both the United States and Portugal, their shared trade became essential 
in the Napoleonic period and especially during the War of 1812. In fact, 
between 1810 and 1814, Portugal composed just shy of 40% of total foreign 
imports into U.S. ports. Conversely, the United States was the second most 
important importer for Portugal between 1808 and 1813, largely due to the 
grain and foodstuff needs compounded by the Napoleonic Wars. The earlier 
trade connections discussed in this essay served as the foundations for trade 
that could be scaled up or down as necessary to meet either partner’s needs 
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(Land, Eloranta and Moreira 2019, 41-45). Philadelphia’s relationship with 
Lisbon highlights the importance of Philadelphia in the larger, Atlantic and 
global maritime trade networks that defined the 18th century. 
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Numbers of ships entering and clearing the port of Philadelphia in 
selected five year periods
 
 
West Indies South. Europe North America Ireland England Totals
E C E C E C E C E C E C
1730-34 360 416 48 93 324 312 28 52 113 86 873 959
1750-54 686 831 199 182 913 954 54 180 210 79 2,062 2,226
1770-74 1,220 1,308 470 505 1,522 1,699 69 141 270 132 3,551 3,785
Source: Jensen (1963, 290).
Appendix 2. Tonnage of ships entering and clearing the port of Philadelphia, 
1768-1772
West Indies Southern Europe Coastal Trade Ireland England Totals
E C E C E C E C E C E C
1768 11,677 12,019 5,001 7,255 9,898 10,534 1,470 3,482 6,924 4,134 34,970 37,424
1769 11,726 11,114 9,685 12,040 12,425 10,468 2,995 3,170 5,504 4,049 42,333 40,871
1770 14,946 13,842 13,620 10,940 11,951 14,111 2,267 4,791 4,705 3,208 47,489 46,892
1771 13,397 13,449 6,345 7,110 12,296 15,688 1,545 3,470 8,157 3,222 41,740 43,029
1772 12,947 15,674 8,120 8,415 12,351 15,099 1,125 2,491 7,757 3,123 42,300 44,822
Source: Jensen (1963, 290).
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•
NEGÓCIOS ILÍCITOS: O COMÉRCIO ENTRE FILADÉLFIA E LISBOA ANTES DA INDEPENDÊNCIA, 
1700-1775 
Este artigo explora a relação económica entre Lisboa e Filadélfia antes da sua independência 
do império britânico. Tecnicamente ilegal de acordo com as várias políticas imperiais que 
a Grã-Bretanha impôs às colónias americanas, Filadélfia construiu e manteve uma robusta 
parceria comercial com o porto de Lisboa. Usando dados de arquivos tanto em Filadélfia 
como em Lisboa, argumentamos que esta relação significa uma orientação de Filadélfia 
à margem das Ilhas Britânicas e a sua importância na economia atlântica. 
Palavras-chave: comércio, colonialismo, Filadélfia, Lisboa, Portugal, Estados Unidos.
AFFAIRES ILLICITES: LE COMMERCE ENTRE PHILADELPHIE ET LISBONNE AVANT 
L’INDÉPENDANCE, 1700-1775 
Cet ar ticle explore les relations économiques entre Lisbonne et Philadelphie avant 
l’indépendance de Philadelphie de l’Empire britannique. Techniquement illégale selon les 
différentes politiques impériales imposées par la Grande-Bretagne aux colonies américai-
nes, Philadelphie a établi et maintenu un partenariat commercial solide avec le port de 
Lisbonne. En utilisant des données provenant d’archives à Philadelphie et à Lisbonne, 
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nous affirmons que cette relation signifie que Philadelphie s’éloigne des îles Britanniques 
et qu’elle joue un rôle important dans l’économie de l’Atlantique. 
Mots-clés: commerce, colonialisme, Philadelphie, Lisbonne, Portugal, États-Unis.
